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Abstract
By using data from many waves of the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Surveys, we explore the dynamics of the determinants of bilateral portfolio invest-
ments. In particular, the main goal of our analysis is that of understanding whether
a diversification motive can also be found, among the various determinants. We
find strong evidence that, indeed, our proxies for a diversification motive, i.e. the
correlation between the idiosyncratic components of GDP growth, as well as the
correlation between stock returns among pair of countries, are relevant to explain
bilateral portfolio holdings, when unobserved heterogeneity is properly taken into
account, by means of a country pair-fixed effect, panel estimation.
Interestingly, the same results cannot be obtained from cross section estimations.
The diversification motive is less relevant, ifl significant at all, in deciding whether
or not to invest in a particular country. On the other hand, it also turns out that
the fact of investing in stocks of less synchronized partner economies does not bring
about a lot of income smoothing, as one might have expected or hoped for.
Keywords: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, risk sharing, gravity models
JEL codes: F210, F150, F410
1 Introduction
The objective of this work is to explore the determinants of cross country equity portfolio
allocations, and in particular the role of risk sharing among them. Applying a gravity
model as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) on data from the Coordinated Portfolio In-
vestment Surveys by the IMF (which reports total bilateral portfolio investment assets),
we investigate on whether investment decisions of source countries are inspired, among the
others, by risk sharing objectives.
It is often claimed that the recent surge in globalization opens up new and large oppor-
tunities for international risk sharing. The underlying idea is that under the hypothesis
of complete markets (perfect risk sharing) agents should invest in foreign countries with
a negatively correlated business cycles, or in those countries whose business cycles differ
in volatility1. That this may or may not have occurred is a largely empirical matter, and
evidence is far from unambiguous.
Moreover, there are two, equally interesting issues to be discussed. First, if countries were
willing to reap all the potential benefits from financial globalization, we would expect a
negative reaction of bilateral equity holdings to correlations between partner countries’ id-
iosyncratic components of GDP. In order to diversify risk, agents within a country should
invest in partner countries whose idiosyncratic GDP is negatively correlated with inno-
vations to domestic income, which would provide the investing country with insurance
against its own idiosyncratic risk. Secondly, even if this were the case, it should still be
checked whether or not cross-ownership of equity does bring about the desired level of
income smoothing; in fact, it might still be the case that the resulting portfolio allocations
are not such to secure the desired level of diversification or that, even more likely, less
idiosyncratic risk leaves room for more aggregate risk.
In this work we mainly focus on the first of the two questions, as we strive to check whether
or not countries invest more in assets of less synchronised economies. This empirical ques-
tion was also dealt with in some recent papers, namely a contribution by Portes and Rey
(2005) and another by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008); in the former, the authors ana-
lyze bilateral portfolio equity trades in the context of a gravitational model and find weak
evidence for a diversification motive as an explanatory variable, after controlling for infor-
mational frictions. The diversification motive is captured in their model by such variables
as the correlation in economies’ growth rates, stock returns and growth rates and stock
returns.
In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) the authors, always in the context of a gravitational
model, analyze bilateral portfolio equity holdings, and conclude that cross country equity
holdings do not seem to be driven by diversification purposes.
In order to explore this issue more thoroughly, we extend these seminal works along several
dimensions. On the one hand, we use the 2001-2009 waves of the Coordinated Portfolio In-
vestment Survey (CPIS in the sequel) to perform a repeated cross section analysis, in search
for time varying determinants of cross equity ownership positions. More importantly, we
use the available data to build a panel dataset, which helps control for individual (pair
of countries) unobserved heterogeneity, which cannot be accounted for otherwise, which
turns out to yield remarkably different results. That this is indeed the case will be shown
1Even though business cycles were perfectly synchronized it would still be possible to pool risk exploit-
ing differences in volatility of the business cycles.
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in section 4, where the main empirical findings are illustrated.
Thirdly, the explanatory variable we use to identify a diversification motive is an original
one, derived from the decomposition of GDP growth rates in an idiosyncratic and an ag-
gregate component, by means of a simple OLS regression. In fact, the correlation in the
idiosyncratic components of GDP growth will be used, as an alternative to other more
standard variables, to investigate on this issue.
The paper also offers a partial answer to the second question, i.e. on whether or not
this diversification motive does bring about some benefits in terms of income smoothing.
By applying the methodology introduced in the seminal paper by Asdrubali et al. (1996)
we find some weak evidence that, indeed, countries holding equity positions in less syn-
chronized host economies tend to enjoy more income smoothing by foreign assets income
inflows. Moreover, income smoothing seems to be enhanced in the face of positive, rather
than negative, shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 frames our empirical question into
the current literature, while section 3 presents the data and some descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents the main empirical findings, while section 5 contains some final com-
ments. The detailed description of the variables used in the empirical analyses is relegated
to the Appendix.
2 Literature review
The issue of portfolio equity investments has been dealt with, from a theoretical standpoint,
from a number of perspectives: financial market incompleteness, transactional frictions in
asset markets, and frictions in goods markets. All of these perspectives have in common
the fact that the mutual fund separation theorem does not hold, and that one normally
sees a certain amount of home bias in domestic portfolio holdings. In addition, all of these
theoretical models provide some insights for the construction of empirical models of port-
folio equity investments.
Previous empirical works have dealt with the geography of investment flows, but always
with some specific limits dictated by data availability. In particular, most contributions
have studied the investment positions of a single country (most often, the United States),
or of very few countries. In general, most such contributions have made use of gravity mod-
els, of the kind used in international trade analysis, to analyze foreign direct investments
and banking flows. For example, Wei (2000) and Stein and Daude (2007) have analyzed
the geography of FDI, while Buch (2002) and Rose and Spiegel (2004) have concentrated
on bank lending and borrowing. In all these papers the role of bilateral trade as a driver
of investment and the role of bank lending have been singled out. There has also been
a number of studies concentrating on bilateral equity investments, such as Ahearne et al.
(2004), Dahlquist et al. (2003), Yildrim (2003), most frequently dealing with the case of
United States, and with the issue of portfolio home bias. Two remarkable exceptions stand
out in the empirical literature on this topic, i.e. the seminal contributions by Portes and
3
Rey (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), which we consider as the benchmarks for
our analysis. In the seminal paper by Portes and Rey (2005), the authors build on the
theoretical work by Martin and Rey (2004), where a model of general equilibrium with
endogenous asset formation leads to a gravitational model empirical specification for asset
trades. Portes and Rey (2005) estimate a gravitational model by using a novel dataset
including 14 countries, for the period 1989-1996. The paper by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008) applies a similar gravitational model to explain bilateral portfolio equity holdings
among a very large number of source and host countries, using data from the Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), run by the International Monetary Fund. In partic-
ular, the authors use data from the second CPIS, relating to the 2001 wave of the Survey,
featuring data from 67 source and 218 host countries.
The analysis by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) departs from earlier contributions in sev-
eral ways: by resorting to a very wide pool of source and host countries, it can provide a
better identification of the potential determinants of portfolio equity investments; by devel-
oping a double fixed effects empirical specification, i.e. adding to the empirical model two
sets of country dummies, respectively for source and host countries, purports to isolate the
relative contribution of bilateral factors, relating to source and host countries. Among the
other factors whose relevance was tested in their empirical work, a diversification motive
was also included, but the corresponding results were mixed.
Risk sharing and home bias (and consequently portfolio investments) have recently been
linked in the papers by Lewis (1999), and by Sorensen et al. (2007). Absence of interna-
tional portfolio diversification and (international) risk sharing may be closely linked, as
agents who diversify their portfolios internationally are more likely to obtain smoother
income and consumption, as for example in the model by Heathcote and Perri (2004).
Sorensen et al. (2007) find that home bias decreased while risk sharing increased during
the 1990s. They measure risk sharing as the distance of consumption growth from a sit-
uation of perfect markets (perfect consumption risk sharing), and provide a measure of
income risk sharing. Both measures show improvements, which would hint at a robust and
positive correlation between level of foreign portfolio assets and income risk sharing, and
between foreign direct investment (FDI) and consumption risk sharing.
This issue is clearly related to another very “hot” issue in the recent literature: whether
or not the surge in financial liberalization that occurred in the last two decades has ef-
fectively improved on the risk sharing opportunities available to the economies involved.
The economic literature is rather divided on this, and the empirical evidence is also mixed.
For example, Giannone and Reichlin (2006) register an increase in risk sharing among Eu-
ropean countries from the early 1990s when market integration significantly accelerated.
They also warn, however, that estimates on selected subsamples may be affected by the
subsample choice itself.
Kose et al. (2008) find very weak links between financial globalization and risk sharing, over
the period 1960-2004, and for the two subsamples 1960-1986 (pre-globalization) and 1987-
2004 (globalization). In particular, they find that although globalization does not seem
to have exerted any significant impact on risk sharing for the whole sample of countries
and the whole period, it had a negative impact on risk sharing for emerging economies.
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For the shorter globalization sample, only developed countries seem to have reaped some
benefits from financial globalization in term of risk sharing, whereas the subset of emerg-
ing economies does not seem to have been affected, at least in a statistically significant
way. On the other hand, Kose et al. (2006) noticed that financial openness, as measured
by gross capital flows as a ratio to GDP, is associated to an increase in the ratio of con-
sumption volatility to income volatility, contrary to the notions of improved international
risk-sharing opportunities through financial integration.
Kaminsky et al. (2005) investigate over the relationship of net income flows and GDP,
and find that net capital flows are procyclical in most OECD and developing countries,
i.e. countries tend to borrow in good times and repay in bad times, which would suggest
that these flows may play a destabilising role. On the other hand, Bai and Zhang (2004)
conduct a regression analysis (both panel and cross section) dividing their whole sample
(1973-1998) in two distinct sub-samples (1973-1985; 1986-1998) and conducting separate
tests for 19 developed countries, for 21 developing countries and for the whole set of coun-
tries. Their study shows that, although the degree of financial integration doubles from
the first to the second sub-period, there is no substantial improvement in international
risk sharing. Moreover, they claim that international risk sharing is not sensitive to the
increase in financial integration.
That the need or possibility for diversification of idiosyncratic risks may also be a deter-
minant for bilateral portfolio positions has surfaced in other recent contributions, but only
very few have attempted to perform an empirical verification. An interesting work, in this
field, is that by Bracke and Schmitz (2008), trying to understand whether portfolio equity
investments play a role in consumption risk sharing both via net investment income and
via capital gains. To do so, they analyze a dataset comprising 35 industrial and emerging
market economies. Our work is also closely related to some recent papers dealing with the
issue of understanding whether stronger economic linkages among countries are associated
to more or less synchronized business cycles. Here, too, the empirical evidence is not un-
ambiguos. Recent works by Imbs (2006), Kose et al. (2004) and Otto and Willard (2001)
show that more bilateral portfolio equity flows bring about more correlated business cycles.
On the other hand, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) show that when fixed pair and time effects
are properly taken into account, the empirical relationship between portfolio equity cross
holdings and business sinchronization becomes negative. In this respect, our findings are
extremely close to the latter, as we also find that the empirical relationship between cross
country equity portfolio holdings and some measure of (idiosyncratic) output correlation
switches from positive to negative as we move from a cross section to a fixed effect, panel
specification. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity seems therefore crucial in correctly
assessing the impact of less correlated cycles onto cross country equity holdings, and vice
versa. In this paper, as anticipated in the introduction, we intend to take one step for-
ward, by explicitly introducing a proxy for the diversification motive in a gravity model
for bilateral portfolio investments.
5
3 Data
Data on bilateral equity holdings for years 2001 up to 2009 come from several waves of
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). For each reporting country and for each year, the survey reports the year-end value
of the stock of cross-border equity holdings disaggregated by issuer country. Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2008) recognize that the main limitations of the 2001 survey originate from
the following facts: incomplete source/host country coverage, heterogeneity of collection
methods, underreporting of assets and biases induced by third-party holdings. In our
analysis problems arising from collection methods are attenuated by using nine waves of
the CPIS survey, as the quality of data collected by source countries increases after the first
participation to the survey (Warnock (2006)). Moreover, in order to reduce the relevance
of the last two limitations of the dataset and in particular biases originated by the mutual
funds industry (Felettigh and Monti (2008)), we have excluded offshore countries from the
analysis.
For comparative purposes we included 67 source2 countries and 218 host countries3 as
in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). Original data are expressed in current US dollars. As
we are interested in the real changes of cross country holdings (actual purchases or sales
of assets over time), and since the value of asset holdings may also change because prices
(both of stock and of currencies) do, we need to offset these nominal changes, by deflating
data on equity holdings using a Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) price index
(period average, base year 2001), and by using an index number of bilateral exchange rate
between US dollars and the currency of the host country (base year 2001). By the same
token, bilateral trade across countries has been adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations. As
a result of all these adjustments, equity values are expressed in 2001 current US dollars, at
2001 stock prices. Most covariates have been computed following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008).4
In tables 1 and 2 we report percentage shares and the growth rates of bilateral equity asset
holdings (weighted by period average shares) aggregating over 6 major areas. Data are
expressed, as explained in the previous section, at “constant, 2001 prices” , since they are
adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and for valuation effects. Offshore centers have
been removed, to avoid distortions. Thus, statistics in table 1 and 2 refer to the dependent
variable of our regression analyses.
Over the period 2001-2009, the weight of OECD countries is still dominant, since around
74 percent of the total amount of equity asset holdings is due to U.S., UK and Euro Area;
however, their role is becoming less important over the observed period of time. In partic-
ular, the U.S. and the Euro Area lost respectively about 5 and 2.5 percent of their shares,
while UK just lost 0.9 percent. On the contrary, Japan gained one percentage point, other
OECD countries and Emerging markets registered a remarkable increase of their weight
2See appendix A for a complete list of source and host countries included in the analysis.
3Source refers to countries undertaking an investment, i.e. purchasing equities in a foreign country,
while hosts refers to countries receiving the investment.
4For a detailed description of data see appendix B.
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(around 4 percent).
Unweighted rates of growth of equity asset holdings5 reveals how Emerging markets quadru-
pled their international portfolio size, “other OECD countries” and Japan doubled, whereas
U.S., UK and the Euro Area have been growing below average, increasing their equity asset
positions by around 50 percent. If we now look at weighted rates of growth (by the corre-
sponding percentage shares of the total, reported in table 2), about half of the increase in
total investment can be attributed to emerging markets and to “other OECD countries”.
Summing up, total growth of equity asset holdings amounts to 76.2 percent and the in-
creasing role of emerging economies and the attractiveness of U.S. and European markets
for these countries become quite evident. Moreover, the persistence of bilateral invest-
ment patterns decreased somehow over the whole time horizon in comparison to what was
detected by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) between 2001 and 2005.6It seems fair to say
that, looking at data, we find evidence of an ongoing change of the international investment
patterns, calling for a deeper investigation over the entire available time horizon.
4 Empirical findings
This section describes the way we used CPIS data for our empirical analyses. Several cross
section regressions have been estimated, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), controlling
for countries’ characteristics by the inclusion of “double fixed effects” for source and host
countries, whereas our panel regressions include individual fixed effects for each pair of
source-host countries, which is less restrictive and allows controlling for specific “pair”
effects. The combination of any two countries, in fact, might be influenced by a fixed
factor which may be different from the combination of the two individual countries effects.
After Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the estimated model for our cross section regressions
is:
log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij (1)
where xij is the portfolio equity holdings of country i in country j; Zij is a vector of co-
variates; φi and φj are dummy variables for source and host countries, respectively. This
model includes a dummy variable for each source and each host country, so that the con-
stant term is the sum of φi and φj, capturing individual heterogeneity of countries i and
j. This approach allows exploiting the bilateral dimension of the data to take into account
nationals’ characteristics.
However, since our dataset comprises several cross sections, corresponding to various time
periods, the time dimension can also be used, allowing for the inclusion of standard indi-
vidual fixed effects, i.e. source-host pairs dummies. The inclusion of “country pairs fixed
effects” allows to capture that heterogeneity which characterizes any bilateral portfolio
5Not reported. Available upon request.
6If one regresses, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the log of equity positions in 2001 on the log of
equity positions in 2005, one obtains an elasticity of 0.84, while the same exercise between 2001 and 2009
yields an elasticity of about 0.73.
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equity allocations. This is more general than the source and host dummy case, which
imposes each country’s fixed effect to be identical irrespective of the partner country (host
or source). In terms of the number of dummy variables to be estimated, in the more re-
strictive model a total of i+j individual dummies is to be estimated, while in the panel
estimation i · j individual fixed effects are included.
Therefore, for the panel analysis we adopt the following original fixed effects model speci-
fication:
log(xijt) = φij + νt + βZijt + ijt (2)
where φij are individual intercepts and νt are time fixed effects.
4.1 Cross section analysis
For comparative purposes, the first step of our analysis consists in replicating the empirical
evidence offered by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for the year 2001 and its extension for
the whole available sampling period, i.e. 2002-2009, in order to assess possible changes over
time in the determinants of international asset allocation choices of responding countries.
The estimation results, presented in tables 3-5 for the whole sample and the restricted,
OECD sample and the emerging economies, respectively, essentially confirm those pre-
sented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008): throughout the years, bilateral trade is the
single most important explanatory variable of cross country portfolio holdings, though its
relevance is larger in the first years of the sample for OECD countries, whereas the contrary
is true for emerging market economies.
Other variables proxying for information asymmetries and sociocultural proximity are more
or less significant in explaining portfolio holdings, over the years: the logarithm of distance,
of time difference, and various dummies for common language, ex colonial past, for being
party in a tax treaty, or in a currency union.
The variables used to identify a diversification motive for portfolio cross holdings are of-
ten significant, but with the “wrong”, positive, sign. Their estimated coefficients seem to
indicate that agents hold portfolios in countries which are rather similar, in terms of busi-
ness cycle dynamics and stock markets. We also introduced some additional explanatory
variables. In particular, we replaced the variable expressing the correlation between GDP
growths with a different one, containing the correlation among the idiosyncratic compo-
nents of GDP growth. Details about the computation of this variable can be found in the
data appendix. The estimated coefficient of this variable is also positive, and does not
bring new elements into the picture.
One more explanatory variable is worth mentioning, the overall score of freedom in the
host country, produced by The Heritage Foundation7. It always enters with a positive and
significant coefficient across all estimation periods for the full sample and the OECD set,
while it gains importance and significance for emerging economies as we move towards the
end of the time horizon (2009, though, seems to be an exception). Tables 3-5 give an idea
7http://www.heritage.org/
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of the variability across years of estimated coefficients; a cursory reading of these tables
show that, for the whole sample of countries, the coefficients of the most important ex-
planatory variable, bilateral trade, increases in magnitude over the whole sample, though
non monotonically.
The relevance of the other significant variables, i.e. time difference, common language,
colonial past, common legal origin and the overall score of freedom in the host country,
significantly varies across periods, but at the end of the time horizon is not very different
from what it was at the beginning. As for the OECD countries, the relevance of the bi-
lateral trade has an opposite behavior (i.e. decreases over time). The estimated models
for the emerging countries are the ones yielding the less satisfactory results, with many
explanatory variables being only occasionally significant.
4.2 Panel analysis
The estimation results change in a remarkable way as we move to a veritable panel estima-
tion. As is well known, in the context of panel estimations it is possible to properly assess
the relevance of fixed effects, i.e. the impact of factors which are peculiar to the individual
observations. In our case each observation concerns a pair (source-host) of countries, and
the fixed effect refers to some factor which plays a role for this couple, but not necessarily
for each economy in isolation. Therefore, any fixed effect is likely to capture the (possibly
stable) effect of variables which are specific to the interaction of those economies, and which
cannot be observed or are difficult to quantify. It is highly plausible that such unaccounted
for factors be correlated with our proxies for diversification motives (correlations between
stock market returns, or correlation between idiosyncratic components of GDP). This un-
observed factors may then have an impact on the sign and significance of the estimated
coefficients of the latter, if the former become part of the disturbance term, as is likely to
be the case in purely cross sectional estimations. As already hinted at above, simple source
and host country effects, which were included in the cross sectional estimations, may not
adequately account for such factors.
On the other hand, endogeneity of our diversification proxies may also be an issue, as
was clarified in a previous section. Endogeneity may come in as reverse causation, going
from cross country equity positions to correlation in stock returns or in the idiosyncratic
components of GDP growth. We do not take a specific (theoretical or empirical) stance
on this issue, which should constitute the topic of further work. However, we adopt an
instrumental variable, fixed effect panel estimation methodology, which guarantees consis-
tency of our coefficients’ estimates. This has been done only for estimations in levels, as
for log difference estimations we did not find adequate instruments. However, it also seems
that the case for endogeneity is less compelling for log differences. The instruments used
(lags of the proxies for diversification and lags of bilateral trade) satisfactorily pass both
the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions and a simple F test of joint significance (in
explaining the endogenous variables).
We report in table 6 panel estimates over the period 2001-2009 for the whole sample and
the two subsamples (OECD countries and Emerging economies). We may immediately
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observe that, as this specification includes both time and cross section fixed effects, all the
variables which are time invariant cannot be included, their effect being somehow summa-
rized in the cross section fixed effects.
While the effect of bilateral trade is almost always strong and positive, and the overall level
of freedom in the host country is always positively significant, as it was the case in the
cross section and pooled cross section estimations, our original research question receives
a completely different answer from these estimations. In almost all model specifications
both the correlation between the idiosyncratic components of GDP and the correlation in
stock returns turns out to be significantly negative. Interestingly, even in the face of a
positive correlation between the two variables, they are both significant, suggesting that
the comovements between the idiosyncratic components of GDP are significant even if one
controls for the correlation between stock returns in the two economies. This is true both
for the linear specifications and for the non linear, Tobit specification (but only for the
correlation in the idiosyncratic components of GDP).
When we look at the results for the two subsamples, however, the diversification motive is
supported by the linear specification, but not by the Tobit model. This suggests that the
decision to engage in portfolio investments, and the decision about the size of the invest-
ment, might have different determinants relative to the subsamples. In particular, it turns
out that the former depends more on the closeness and similarity of the pair of economies,
although it may well be the case that once the decision to hold an equity position in a
country is taken, the investment size may also be determined by diversification motives.
This is confirmed by the regression results of the corresponding probit models (column
6 of table 6), where one of the diversification variables, namely the correlation in stock
returns, has a positive and significant coefficient. We get a different result with the tax
treaty variable. The fact that a pair of countries are engaged in a tax treaty appears to be
significant in determining the choice of investing, but it does not seem to have an impact
upon the relative dimension of portfolio investments.
That diversification may have opposite effects on the choice of investing and on the cor-
responding amounts is somehow reminiscent of the discussion of the empirical results in
Portes and Rey (2005), where the authors observe that the variables proxying for a diver-
sification motive enter with a positive sign if one does not control for information frictions
(above all, distance), whereas the sign becomes (weakly) negative when such factors are
controlled for. In our panel estimations information frictions should be captured by the
pair fixed effects, and the larger dataset (and possibly the different estimation horizon)
allows us to better identify a diversification motive at work.
4.3 Business cycle desynchronization and risk sharing
The existence of differences among national business cycles opens the way to insurance
possibilities which can be exploited to reduce the longitudinal variance of national income,
thus increasing national welfares. Up to this point we have been able to identify a diversi-
fication motive as a determinant of portfolio choices. On the other hand, in the previous
paragraphs we found that the correlation between the idiosyncratic components of GDP
10
growth (and in stock returns) plays a non negligible role in driving the cross-border alloca-
tion of investments in the global stock market. Does this necessarily entail that portfolio
allocations have been effective in insuring countries against bad states of nature?
To deal with this matter, we measure the degree of risk sharing achieved through equity
purchases on foreign stock markets. Foreign equities held by residents generate an income
that adds to their disposable income and is recorded in the current account of the balance
of payments. Following a methodology developed by Asdrubali et al. (1996) we assess the
degree of income smoothing brought about by the holding of foreign equities (for a de-
tailed explanation of the methodology see Appendix C). The analysis has been conducted
separately for the set of countries adhering to the European Monetary Union (EMU) and
for the set of OECD countries. Firstly, we have computed a measure of lack of (poten-
tially exploitable) risk sharing opportunities, given by the (weighted) mean correlation of
idiosyncratic GDP growth of a given source country with idiosyncratic GDP growth of all
its host countries. Next, we have computed, for each country of the group, the degree of
risk sharing achieved through foreign equity holdings.
Table 8 contains the values taken by these two variables for the various countries, as well as
various indices of correlations among them. All in all, if we consider all (positive and neg-
ative) shocks, our priors are weakly confirmed in the case of EMU countries (significance
values of correlations in the range 0.20-0.25), while they should be strongly rejected for the
set of OECD countries. However, if we distinguish among positive and negative shocks,
we obtain a somewhat neater picture. Indeed, for EMU countries correlations are strongly
significant (significance values in the range 0.01-0.02) in the case of positive shocks, while
they are not significant at all in the case of negative shocks.
In other words, equity holdings in less ”synchronized” economies help smooth income peaks
associated to good states of nature, while they do not seem effective in smoothing income
troughs experienced during bad states of nature. Moreover, by directly looking at the val-
ues of mean correlations and percentages of income smoothing for the various countries we
realize that, despite a non significant negative correlation, the widest percentages of income
smoothing in the face of negative shocks via portfolio equity holdings are obtained by those
countries featuring a low (under 0.20) mean correlation in the dynamics of idiosyncratic
GDP growth.
5 Conclusions
The recent surge in financial globalization opened up many investment opportunities for
the countries involved. One possible outcome of this process is an increase in portfolio
diversification, if bilateral holdings are also driven by diversification motives. Whether
or not this has been the case is the research question addressed in this paper, where we
extend the analysis proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) to the 2001-2009 waves
of the IMF Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey; this question is addressed by means
of both cross section and panel methodologies. The main empirical result of our analysis
is that, indeed, a diversification motive emerges from the data, which mainly concerns the
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relative size of portfolio holdings. It also turns out, however, that the decision to open
portfolio positions in a country depends more on symmetries, rather than differences, in
the two countries’ cycles.
Our empirical results also shed some light upon the issue of business cycle desynchroniza-
tion among portfolio partner countries and the corresponding capabilities of income risk
sharing.
6 Appendix A
List of source countries excluding offshore centers:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Ko-
rea (Republic of), Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
List of host countries excluding offshore centers:
Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azer-
baijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France,
French Guiana, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Greenland, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (Democratic People’s Re-
public of), Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino, Sa˜o Tome`
and Pr`ıncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Helena, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, United States Minor Outlying
Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vatican City State, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands
(United States), Wallis and Futuna Islands, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, Zambia,
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Zimbabwe.
7 Appendix B
Bilateral portfolio equity holdings:
millions of U.S. dollar of portfolio equity holdings issued by host countries and held by
source country. Source 2001-2009 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
Bilateral trade:
five-year backward looking moving average of imports plus exports over the period 2001-
2009. Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
Colony Dummy:
dummy taking the value 1 if source and host country ever had a colonial relationship and
zero otherwise. Source Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Common Language:
dummy variable taking value 1 if host and source countries share the same language and
zero otherwise. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Common Legal Origin:
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the source and and host countries have a legal system
with a common origin (common law, French, German or Scandinavian) and 0 otherwise.
Source: Porta et al. (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Correlation between growth-stock returns:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between annual GDP growth
rates in the source country and real stock returns in the host country over the period 2001-
2009. For the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has
been restricted to just ten years. Source: authors’ calculation based on Morgan Stanley
Capital International (Datastream) and World Bank (on-line database World Development
Indicators).
Correlation in GDP growth rates:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between the annual GDP
growth rate of source and host countries over the period 2001-2009. For the IV estimation
the aforementioned backward looking moving average has been restricted to just ten years.
Source: authors’ calculation based on World Bank (on-line database: World Development
Indicators).
Correlation in idiosyncratic GDP:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between the annual idiosyn-
cratic GDP growth rate of source and host countries over the period 2001-2009. For the
IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has been restricted
to just ten years. The idiosyncratic component of GDP growth is computed as the esti-
mated residuals of the following regression ∆ log(GDPit) = β∆ log(GDPat) + it. Where
∆ log(GDPit) is the country i GDP rate of growth and ∆ log(GDPat) represents the aver-
age rate of growth of the reference group (in our case: all countries; OECD countries and
Emerging Markets). The GDP growth rate of a given country is therefore decomposed in
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two orthogonal components: in fact, ∆ log(GDPit) = β̂∆ log(GDPat) + eit, thus the id-
iosyncratic GDP growth will be orthogonal to the aggregate (group average) GDP growth
by construction: eit⊥β̂∆ log(GDPat). The more standard practice (e.g. Asdrubali et al.
(1996)) consists in simply subtracting the group average GDP growth to each country’ s
GDP rate of growth. However, this practice does not guarantee orthogonality between
aggregate and idiosyncratic GDP growth and may generate serious omitted variable bias
if one of the regressors strongly correlates with the aggregate GDP growth. Moreover the
standard decomposition restricts the coefficient attached to aggregate GDP to be equal to
1, while the empirical evidence contradicts this assumption.
Correlation in stock returns:
eleven-year backward looking moving average correlation between the monthly stock mar-
ket returns of the host and source country, expressed in U.S. dollars over the period 2001-
2009. For the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has
been restricted to just five years. Source: authors’ calculations based on returns data from
Morgan Stanley Capital International (Datastream).
Currency Union Dummy:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries are in a currency union and
zero otherwise. Source Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004)
Log distance:
logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of source and host
country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Overall score of freedom in the host country:
overall freedom score ranging from zero to 100 given by the average of ten component
scores: business freedom; trade freedom; fiscal freedom; Government spending; monetary
freedom; investment freedom; financial freedom; property rights; freedom from corruption;
labour freedom. All 10 components are weighted equally. Source The Heritage Foundation
(http://www.heritage.org/)
Tax Treaty:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries enacted a double taxation agree-
ment prior to 1999. Agreements considered are: Capital, Income and Capital, Income and
Inheritance. Double taxation agreements on Air, Land and Sea Transport have been ex-
cluded. Source: Authors’ elaborations on DTT (Double Taxation Treaties) database from
www.unctad.org.
Time Difference:
absolute value of of time difference between host and source country (from 1 to 12). Source:
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004)
8 Appendix C
In the analysis reported in table (8), applying a time series counterpart of the variance
decomposition first introduced by Asdrubali et al. (1996), we computed the percentage of
risk sharing achieved through financial asset income inflows (sub-component of the factor
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income) as in Balli et al. (2011). Thus, for each country of the two groups considered
(OECD and EMU countries), we estimated the following equation obtaining the percentage
of income smoothing achieved by income inflows deriving from financial assets holding by
each single country.
˜∆ logGDPINt = β+f ˜∆ logGDPt + t
where:
GDPINt = (GDP+financial assets income inflows);˜∆ logGDPINt = (∆ logGDPINt −∆ logGDPINat );˜∆ logGDPt = (∆ logGDPt −∆ logGDP at );
∆ logGDPINat and ∆ logGDP
a
t are group averages. 1 − β+f is the percentage of income
smoothing achieved through the portfolio equity holdings channel (inflows). We then dis-
tinguished between positive and negative idiosyncratic shocks, identifying positive shocks
as those corresponding to periods of positive output gap8. This allows to estimate the
smoothing role of assets income inflows in the face of asymmetries in shocks.
˜∆ logGDPINt = β+f1 ˜∆ logGDPt+ + β+f2 ˜∆ logGDPt− + t
where 1 − β+f1 is the percentage of risk sharing with respect to positive shocks, while
1 − β+f2 is the same measure in response to negative shocks. The data span is from 1980
to 2009 (annual frequency). Source: International Monetary Fund (Balance of Payments
Statistics).
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Table 1: International Equity Asset Holdings
(% shares over the year-total)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001-2009
United States 0.0 7.3 9.4 5.7 5.4 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.7 0.0 3.7 1.6 1.0 1.4 12.5
Euro area 9.2 3.8 9.9 1.5 1.7 1.1 27.3
Japan 3.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.3 5.6
Other OECD Countries 8.9 1.8 3.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 16.7
Emerging markets 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.2 4.5
Total 27.8 14.7 27.3 10.3 9.6 10.3 100.0
2001
United States - 8.8 11.5 4.3 6.2 5.0 35.7
United Kingdom 3.2 - 5.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 12.9
Euro area 8.1 4.2 11.2 1.1 2.2 1.1 27.9
Japan 3.1 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.3
Other OECD Countries 7.2 1.8 3.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 15.2
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.0
Total 22.4 16.6 32.9 7.7 11.3 9.1 100.0
2002
United States - 8.2 10.6 4.9 6.1 4.7 34.5
United Kingdom 4.0 - 4.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 12.8
Euro area 8.2 4.5 11.2 1.3 2.2 0.9 28.3
Japan 3.2 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.4
Other OECD Countries 7.8 1.9 3.3 1.1 1.1 0.6 15.8
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.1
Total 24.0 16.4 30.7 9.0 11.4 8.4 100.0
2003
United States - 8.1 10.0 5.6 5.9 5.6 35.3
United Kingdom 3.9 - 3.6 1.6 1.0 1.5 11.5
Euro area 9.1 4.1 11.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 29.0
Japan 3.2 0.6 0.8 - 0.3 0.2 5.2
Other OECD Countries 7.9 1.8 3.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 15.8
Emerging Countries 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 3.2
Total 24.9 15.7 29.3 10.0 10.2 10.0 100.0
2004
United States - 6.8 10.1 5.6 5.5 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.5 - 4.2 1.6 0.8 1.6 12.7
Euro area 9.6 3.7 11.0 1.7 1.7 1.1 28.8
Japan 3.7 0.7 0.8 - 0.4 0.3 5.8
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 3.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 15.8
Emerging markets 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 3.6
Total 27.1 14.0 29.4 10.2 9.3 10.0 100.0
2005
United States - 6.7 9.3 7.3 5.5 5.8 34.7
United Kingdom 5.0 - 3.5 2.1 1.0 1.4 13.1
Euro area 9.4 3.5 9.7 2.0 1.7 1.2 27.4
Japan 3.6 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.3 5.4
Other OECD Countries 8.3 1.6 2.8 1.4 0.8 0.6 15.5
Emerging markets 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.1 3.9
Total 27.3 13.5 26.4 13.1 9.3 10.4 100.0
2006
United States - 6.5 9.3 6.2 5.1 6.0 33.1
United Kingdom 5.4 - 3.3 1.9 0.9 1.4 13.0
Euro area 10.0 3.6 9.9 2.0 1.6 1.3 28.5
Japan 3.4 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.3
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 2.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 15.8
Emerging markets 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.5 4.3
Total 28.7 13.1 26.4 11.5 8.9 11.4 100.0
2007
United States - 6.0 9.0 6.5 5.1 6.3 32.9
United Kingdom 5.4 - 2.8 1.8 0.8 1.5 12.4
Euro area 9.8 3.2 8.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 26.1
Japan 3.3 0.4 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.2
Other OECD Countries 9.9 1.6 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 17.8
Emerging markets 1.9 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.8 5.6
Total 30.4 12.1 24.4 11.9 8.8 12.4 100.0
2008
United States - 6.4 7.9 6.8 4.7 5.0 30.8
United Kingdom 5.9 - 2.9 1.6 0.7 1.2 12.2
Euro area 10.1 3.4 8.1 0.9 1.4 0.8 24.7
Japan 4.2 0.6 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 6.2
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.0 2.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 19.5
Emerging markets 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 1.7 6.6
Total 34.0 13.8 22.8 11.3 8.2 9.8 100.0
2009
United States - 8.2 7.4 4.3 4.9 5.8 30.6
United Kingdom 5.3 - 3.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 12.0
Euro area 8.9 3.9 8.4 0.9 1.3 1.3 24.7
Japan 4.1 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 6.3
Other OECD Countries 10.5 2.6 3.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 19.5
Emerging markets 2.4 2.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 1.4 6.9
Total 31.3 17.5 23.4 7.9 9.0 11.0 100.0
Table 2: International Equity Asset Holdings
(annual % changes weighted by the share)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001/2009
United States - 5.7 1.4 3.3 2.5 5.2 18.1
United Kingdom 6.1 - -0.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 8.2
Euro area 7.7 2.7 3.6 0.5 0.0 1.1 15.6
Japan 4.1 0.5 0.4 - 0.3 0.5 5.9
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.8 2.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 19.1
Emerging Countries 3.5 2.5 1.0 0.4 0.1 1.8 9.3
Total 32.7 14.2 8.3 6.1 4.6 10.3 76.2
2001/2002
United States - -0.4 -0.7 0.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.5
United Kingdom 0.8 - -1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2
Euro area 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.9
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries 0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.9
Emerging Countries 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Total 2.0 0.1 -1.6 1.5 0.3 -0.5 1.9
2002/2003
United States - 2.7 2.9 2.6 1.9 2.9 12.9
United Kingdom 1.3 - 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.6 2.7
Euro area 4.0 1.0 4.0 0.8 0.3 0.7 10.8
Japan 1.1 0.1 0.2 - 0.1 0.1 1.6
Other OECD Countries 2.8 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 5.5
Emerging Countries 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.2
Total 9.5 4.6 8.7 4.4 2.3 5.0 34.6
2003/2004
United States - -1.8 -0.8 -0.4 -0.9 -0.6 -4.5
United Kingdom 0.2 - 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.1
Euro area -0.3 -0.6 -1.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -2.5
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3
Emerging Countries 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 0.0 -2.8 -2.2 -0.6 -1.6 -0.8 -8.0
2004/2005
United States - 0.4 -0.2 2.2 0.3 0.7 3.4
United Kingdom 0.8 - -0.4 0.7 0.2 -0.1 1.2
Euro area 0.4 0.0 -0.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.3
Japan 0.1 -0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Other OECD Countries 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7
Emerging Countries 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.6
Total 1.9 0.3 -1.4 3.7 0.6 1.1 6.2
2005/2006
United States - 0.5 1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.8 2.0
United Kingdom 1.0 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4
Euro area 1.7 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 4.1
Japan 0.2 0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.5
Other OECD Countries 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 2.0
Emerging Countries 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8
Total 4.4 1.0 2.9 -0.4 0.5 2.2 10.7
2006/2007
United States - -1.1 -1.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -3.4
United Kingdom -0.5 - -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -1.8
Euro area -1.2 -0.7 -2.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -4.9
Japan -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 - 0.0 0.0 -0.6
Other OECD Countries 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3
Emerging Countries 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8
Total -1.1 -2.1 -4.4 -0.8 -1.0 -0.2 -9.6
2007/2008
United States - -1.6 -3.6 -1.9 -1.9 -2.9 -11.7
United Kingdom -1.4 - -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 -4.0
Euro area -2.9 -0.8 -2.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.9 -9.2
Japan -0.5 0.0 -0.2 - -0.1 -0.2 -1.0
Other OECD Countries -2.1 -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -4.4
Emerging Countries -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0
Total -7.1 -2.6 -8.8 -4.1 -3.1 -5.6 -31.3
2008/2009
United States - 9.3 6.2 1.4 4.7 6.0 27.6
United Kingdom 4.3 - 3.1 0.8 1.4 1.1 10.7
Euro area 7.0 4.1 7.9 0.9 1.1 1.7 22.6
Japan 3.6 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 5.9
Other OECD Countries 8.8 3.0 3.1 0.5 1.3 1.0 17.7
Emerging Countries 2.1 2.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.0 6.7
Total 25.8 19.6 21.9 3.7 9.0 11.2 91.2
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Table 6: 2001-2009 Panel estimates with pair fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Panel FE IV Panel FE IV Tobit Tobit Probit Probit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3183∗∗∗ 0.3362∗∗∗ 0.7586∗∗∗ 0.7754∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.3009∗∗ −0.3302∗∗ −0.2715∗∗∗ −0.1924∗∗∗−0.0073 −0.0011
(0.138) (0.138) (0.051) (0.050) (0.009) (0.009)
Tax treaty −0.0519 −0.0573 0.2949∗∗∗ 0.3860∗∗∗ 0.0987∗∗∗ 0.1004∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.102) (0.038) (0.038) (0.006) (0.006)
Correl. in stock returns −2.2683∗∗∗ −2.2229∗∗∗ 5.1106∗∗∗ 4.3438∗∗∗ 0.4401∗∗∗ 0.3837∗∗∗
(0.506) (0.504) (0.096) (0.103) (0.016) (0.016)
Correl. growth-stock return −0.0430 −0.0235 0.1051∗ 0.1910∗∗∗−0.0300∗∗∗−0.0252∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.250) (0.055) (0.054) (0.007) (0.007)
Freedom in the host country 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant −5.1183∗∗∗ −6.7498∗∗∗−8.5580∗∗∗−10.4575∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.546) (0.065) (0.131)
Observations 9427 9427 13229 13229 13438 13438
R-squared 0.089 0.092 0.219 0.225 0.343 0.348
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3385∗∗∗ 0.3472∗∗∗ 0.7664∗∗∗ 0.7945∗∗∗ 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.0753 −0.1036 −0.1492∗∗∗ −0.0666 0.0020 0.0032
(0.121) (0.122) (0.058) (0.056) (0.007) (0.007)
Tax treaty 0.0612 0.0540 0.0750 0.2750∗∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.098) (0.046) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005)
Correl. in stock returns −2.9379∗∗∗ −2.8842∗∗∗ 5.3078∗∗∗ 4.0995∗∗∗ 0.2869∗∗∗ 0.2623∗∗∗
(0.490) (0.489) (0.105) (0.116) (0.012) (0.013)
Correl. growth-stock return −0.0600 −0.0406 0.4185∗∗∗ 0.4714∗∗∗−0.0235∗∗∗−0.0229∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.222) (0.059) (0.058) (0.005) (0.005)
Freedom in the host country 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0433∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant −4.1195∗∗∗ −4.6378∗∗∗−7.9142∗∗∗−10.6443∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.528) (0.071) (0.146)
Observations 6567 6567 8623 8623 8766 8766
R-squared 0.103 0.105 0.253 0.264 0.363 0.364
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1733 0.2074∗ 0.6061∗∗∗ 0.6114∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.1003∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.120) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.1331 −0.0048 −0.5364∗∗∗ −0.4206∗∗∗−0.0336 −0.0063
(0.544) (0.546) (0.067) (0.066) (0.022) (0.022)
Tax treaty −0.3032 −0.2879 −0.1162∗∗ −0.1291∗∗∗ 0.1720∗∗∗ 0.1558∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.256) (0.047) (0.046) (0.014) (0.014)
Correl. in stock returns 1.2633 0.9501 2.7916∗∗∗ 2.2589∗∗∗ 0.6493∗∗∗ 0.5280∗∗∗
(1.331) (1.344) (0.143) (0.145) (0.044) (0.045)
Correl. growth-stock return −0.9500 −1.1560 −0.1713∗∗ −0.0042 −0.0126 0.0189
(0.816) (0.821) (0.080) (0.080) (0.021) (0.021)
Freedom in the host country 0.0628∗∗∗ 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant −8.0323∗∗∗ −11.7632∗∗∗−8.4242∗∗∗−10.7188∗∗∗
(0.574) (1.368) (0.096) (0.183)
Observations 2860 2860 4606 4606 4672 4672
R-squared 0.136 0.140 0.195 0.207 0.332 0.349
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated equations: log(xij) = φij + βZij + ij .
All columns include time dummies. Columns (1) and (2) report instrumental variable fixed effects estimates. We have
employed as excluded instruments lagged values of the following variables: correlation in stock returns, correlation in
growth-stock return, correlation in idiosyncratic GDP and logged bilateral trade. Dependent variable in regressions
(3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001). Dependent variable in regressions (5) and (6) is a binary variable taking value 1 if
xij > 0 and zero otherwise. Columns (5) and (6) report marginal effects.
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Table 7: 2001-2009 Panel estimates in log differences
with pair fixed effects
VARIABLES Panel FE Panel FE Tobit Tobit
Full Sample
∆ log bilateral trade 0.3437∗∗∗ 0.3394∗∗∗ 0.3693∗∗∗ 0.3682∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.068) (0.018) (0.018)
∆Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.1360 −0.1163 −0.0856∗∗∗−0.0987∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.084) (0.028) (0.028)
Tax treaty −0.0656 −0.0409 −0.0283∗∗∗−0.0270∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.060) (0.008) (0.008)
∆Correl. in stock returns 0.6454 0.6536 0.0777 0.1352
(0.476) (0.474) (0.116) (0.117)
∆Correl. growth-stock return 0.3006∗ 0.2931∗ 0.2856∗∗∗ 0.2810∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.164) (0.037) (0.037)
Freedom in the host country −0.0115∗ 0.0016∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.000)
Constant 0.0724 0.7986 0.0720∗∗∗−0.0458∗∗
(0.056) (0.494) (0.011) (0.028)
Observations 8722 8722 9534 9534
R-squared 0.610 0.611 0.177 0.178
OECD countries
∆ log bilateral trade 0.3465∗∗∗ 0.3415∗∗∗ 0.3673∗∗∗ 0.3652∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.072) (0.021) (0.020)
∆Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP −0.1341 −0.1123 −0.0804∗∗ −0.0981∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.086) (0.032) (0.032)
Tax treaty −0.0516 −0.0235 −0.0106 −0.0088
(0.061) (0.061) (0.010) (0.010)
∆Correl. in stock returns 0.6366 0.6460 0.0792 0.1653
(0.494) (0.493) (0.135) (0.135)
∆Correl. growth-stock return 0.3083∗ 0.3005∗ 0.2891∗∗∗ 0.2835∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.172) (0.043) (0.043)
Freedom in the host country −0.0122∗ 0.0019∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.000)
Constant 0.3367∗∗∗ 0.8337∗ 0.4646∗∗∗ 0.3119∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.500) (0.018) (0.036)
Observations 6222 6222 6672 6672
R-squared 0.637 0.638 0.213 0.214
Emerging countries
∆ log bilateral trade 0.2799∗∗ 0.2823∗∗ 0.3351∗∗∗ 0.3316∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.123) (0.043) (0.043)
∆Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.0429 0.0628 0.3644∗∗∗ 0.3472∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.404) (0.100) (0.100)
Tax treaty −0.3720∗∗∗ −0.3883∗∗ −0.0166 −0.0196
(0.143) (0.157) (0.015) (0.015)
∆Correl. in stock returns 0.3308 0.3448 0.2402 0.3417
(1.017) (1.013) (0.331) (0.340)
∆Correl. growth-stock return −0.7002∗ −0.7133∗ −0.7236∗∗∗−0.7106∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.368) (0.106) (0.106)
Freedom in the host country −0.0161 −0.0009
(0.026) (0.001)
Constant 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.2744∗∗∗ 1.2713 0.5137∗∗∗ 0.2138∗∗∗
(0.091) (1.983) (0.040) (0.055)
Observations 2500 2500 2862 2862
R-squared 0.260 0.261 0.0588 0.0589
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated equations: ∆ log(xij) = φij + β∆Zij + ij
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Table 8: Degree of risk sharing versus correlation of idiosyncratic GDP
A) All shocks B) Positive shocks C) Negative shocks
OECD OECD OECD
Inflows Inflows Inflows
Correlation coefficient −0.07 −0.05 −0.01
[0.76] [0.82] [0.95]
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient −0.03 −0.05 −0.18
[0.91] [0.82] [0.42]
Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient −0.03 −0.04 −0.11
[0.87] [0.82] [0.50]
country avg corr GDP id %risk shared %risk shared %risk shared
TUR −0.13 5.16 12.10 2.40
CHL −0.07 −0.10 4.57 −2.59
ISR −0.03 −0.95 0.02 −1.58
ISL 0.05 −15.32 −19.67 −11.19
US 0.09 −5.89 −3.30 −7.99
CHE 0.10 −5.67 −9.89 −3.27
AUS 0.12 −8.44 −41.06 −1.30
KOR 0.13 0.29 2.17 −0.58
IRL 0.15 −19.79 20.14 −80.91
NLD 0.17 16.14 9.48 24.69
GBR 0.19 19.33 24.69 17.73
SWE 0.19 −11.60 1.22 −18.64
FIN 0.20 −3.47 4.32 −6.19
NOR 0.25 −6.91 −13.88 −3.66
DNK 0.28 −0.21 1.78 −1.55
AUT 0.34 3.88 1.33 5.31
GER 0.36 −0.47 4.22 −6.23
CAN 0.36 −4.61 −10.72 −0.71
ITA 0.40 −1.41 5.75 −6.26
FRA 0.40 −14.70 −14.98 −14.58
PRT 0.43 0.11 6.91 −5.26
ESP 0.48 −5.27 −5.18 −5.33
A) All shocks B) Positive shocks C) Negative shocks
EMU EMU EMU
Inflows Inflows Inflows
Correlation coefficient −0.47 −0.75 0.19
[0.20] [0.02] [0.62]
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient −0.43 −0.83 −0.07
[0.24] [0.01] [0.86]
Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient −0.33 −0.67 −0.11
[0.25] [0.02] [0.75]
country avg corr GDP id %risk shared %risk shared %risk shared
IRL 0.15 −13.38 20.71 −61.61
NLD 0.17 26.62 66.82 1.69
FIN 0.20 −1.28 12.27 −4.87
AUT 0.34 10.78 24.22 −5.11
GER 0.36 −2.43 14.37 −23.15
ITA 0.40 −20.78 −21.59 −20.43
FRA 0.40 −34.77 −24.79 −39.99
PRT 0.43 0.78 11.20 −5.10
ESP 0.48 −15.83 −35.81 −7.99
Significance values in parentheses.
The degree of risk sharing is estimated according to the methodology explained in appendix C and it refers only to income
inflows from abroad.
A negative sign for % risk shared means a dis-smoothing effect of asset income inflows from abroad
GDP id stands for idiosyncratic GDP growth rate calculated as explained in appendix B.
26
